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A Class of Their Own: Applying Weak Ascertainability to Settlement-Only Classes in the Third
Circuit
Danielle Lazarus
“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his
or her rights.”1
Small claims class actions sit at the epicenter of a policy struggle. Are they vehicles for
deterring defendants’ unlawful conduct, as suggested above by Amchem?2 Or must courts, when
determining whether to certify small claims class actions, prioritize other policy goals such as
efficiency, fair payouts to class members, and defendants’ due process rights?
The Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard was born out of the latter three
policy objectives. Heightened ascertainability mandates that, as a prerequisite to class
certification, 1) a proposed class must be defined with reference to objective criteria, and 2) there
must be a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition. 3 Although four circuits, including the Third
Circuit, have adopted heightened ascertainability standards, five circuits have adopted weak
ascertainability standards. Under a weak ascertainability standard, there is no administrative
feasibility requirement: classes must only be defined with reference to objective criteria, and the
court need not analyze the mechanism put forth by the named plaintiff to identify potential class
members. Thus, a proposed class filing suit in a circuit with a weak ascertainability standard has
a greater chance at certification.
Following Amchem, which held that a district court may only certify proposed settlementonly classes if they satisfy all of Rule 23’s requirements, district courts are required to conduct
1

Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)
See Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2359, 2364 (2014).
3
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015).
2

1

ascertainability inquiries for both litigation and settlement-only classes. But in both Prudential
and Sullivan, the Third Circuit insulated settlement-only classes from Amchem.4 Instead, in the
Third Circuit, district courts certifying settlement-only classes do not need to conduct a
manageability inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) due to the fact that “the settlement class presents
no management problems because the case will not be tried.” 5 Greater flexibility for settlementonly classes, the Prudential and Sullivan courts reasoned, would incentivize parties to settle,
which would in turn achieve the important policy objectives of global peace and judicial
economy.
Thus, as exemplified by the Third Circuit, courts often approve “settlement-only classes
in cases that would most likely not pass muster as a litigated class action.” 6 But the fate of
settlement-only classes under the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard is less
certain. Comcast is the first and only Third Circuit case to address ascertainability in the context
of a settlement-only class.7 Citing to both Carrera and Sullivan, the Comcast court applied weak
ascertainability to reverse the district court and hold that a settlement-only class comprised of
current and former Comcast subscribers was in fact ascertainable.8 Administrative feasibility was
“not implicated by this case,” the court found, “because the settlement agreement removes the
need for a trial.”9 The court also reasoned that the manageability and due process concerns that
often appear in the litigation context are not at issue in the settlement-only context.10
4

In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 321 (3d Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 303 (3d Cir.
2011).
5
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring).
6
Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1498 (2013).
7
In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8 (3d Cir. 2016).
8
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring).
9
Comcast, 656 F. App’x at 9.
10
Id.
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Comcast is one of many recent cases in which the Third Circuit has demonstrated a
stronger willingness to apply weak ascertainability.11 Weak ascertainability would mean the
certification of more settlement-only classes, and the certification of more settlement-only
classes would mean that Prudential and Sullivan’s policy objectives of global peace and judicial
economy would be more consistently upheld. Keeping the Third Circuit’s more-favorable
attitude toward weak ascertainability in mind, this paper will provide strategies for counsel to
employ before the Third Circuit to insulate settlement-only classes from heightened
ascertainability and to give the class they are representing a greater chance at certification.
In Part I, I survey existing ascertainability law. I first outline the Third Circuit’s
heightened ascertainability standard, tracking the development of the Third Circuit’s treatment of
ascertainability from 2012’s Marcus decision to 2015’s Byrd decision. I then contrast the Third
Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard with other circuits’ weak ascertainability standards,
highlighting the Seventh Circuit’s Mullins decision that adopted weak ascertainability. I also
discuss recent dissenting and concurring opinions that use Mullins as a guidepost to encourage
adopting weak ascertainability in the Third Circuit.
In Part II, I analyze two Third Circuit cases, Prudential and Sullivan, that interpret
Amchem in a way that grants settlement-only classes greater leniency and flexibility than
litigation classes. I then analyze Comcast, and show how it draws upon Sullivan to reverse the
district court’s determination that the proposed settlement-only class was not ascertainable.
In Part III, I sketch out two strategies for counsel use before the Third Circuit to advocate
for weak ascertainability in the settlement-only context, capitalizing upon the court’s recent trend
11

See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 448 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes,
J., concurring); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring); Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., dissenting).

3

favoring weak ascertainability. The first strategy demonstrates how the Third Circuit can read
administrative feasibility into Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiries. The second strategy
proposes that settlement agreements between the parties can serve as substitutes for
ascertainability inquiries by mitigating key policy concerns. In undertaking these strategies, the
Third Circuit would remove administrative feasibility from the settlement-only context, and
continue to treat settlement-only classes with greater flexibility in alignment with Prudential and
Sullivan’s policy objectives of global peace and judicial economy.

I.

Ascertainability in the Third Circuit
a. The development of the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard
In the Third Circuit, for a class to be ascertainable, 1) the class must be defined with

reference to objective criteria, and 2) there must be a reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition. 12
The following three cases—Marcus13, Carrera14, and Byrd15—demonstrate the evolution of the
Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard between Marcus in 2012 and Byrd in 2015.
In Marcus, the court established that ascertainability was, impliedly, part and parcel of
Rule 23 inquiries.16 The court held that a proposed class of BMW owners whose cars were
equipped with defendants’ faulty tires was not ascertainable because the defendants’ records
were incomplete. Further, the only alternative method proposed by the named plaintiff to identify
class members “would amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class members’ say so”
12

Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–594 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id.
14
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
15
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.
16
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593–594.
13
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via self-identifying affidavits.17 Thus, there was no administratively feasible mechanism for
identifying class members.
The Marcus court determined that searching a defendant’s records, if sufficiently
comprehensive, would be an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class members.
But in Marcus, the defendants’ records were incomplete. Although the defendants’ records
contained information about the BMW purchasers, they did not pinpoint with certainty which
cars were equipped with the specific faulty tires: BMW’s cars were assembled by a third-party
company in Germany, and information about that process was not included in BMW’s records.18
The court further determined that if a defendant’s records could not identify class members, then
the named plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a “reliable, administratively feasible
alternative” for identifying class members.19 The court explicitly cautioned district courts against
approving a mechanism that would “accept as true absent persons’ declarations that they are
members of the class,” such as the self-identifying affidavits proposed by the named plaintiff in
Marcus.20 If the named plaintiff were to rely on the defendants’ incomplete records and selfidentifying affidavits for identifying class members, the Marcus court reasoned, then the court
would have to hold individualized “mini-trials” to ensure that each alleged class member actually
fit within the class definition.21 Classes that require “mini trials” to identify putative class
members are not administratively feasible. 22
The Marcus court rationalized imposing a heightened ascertainability standard with three
policy objectives. First, requiring an administratively feasible mechanism for easily identifying
17

Id. at 594.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 593.
22
Id.
18
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class members would eliminate “serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the
efficiencies expected of class actions.” 23 Second, administrative feasibility would protect absent
class members by “facilitating the ‘best notice practicable’” under Rule 23(c). 24 Third,
administrative feasibility would safeguard defendants’ due process rights by identifying who,
exactly, would be bound by the court’s final judgment, and by allowing defendants to challenge
the evidence before the court that purports to identify class members.25
Two years after Marcus, Carrera applied the heightened ascertainability standard to a
proposed class of purchasers of WeightSmart diet supplements.26 Notably, the defendant in
Carrera did not possess any WeightSmart sales records because it only sold WeightSmart
through third-party retailers. 27 The named plaintiff proposed two mechanisms for identifying
class members in the absence of sales records. First, the named plaintiff proposed searching the
third-party retailers’ records of online sales and sales made with customer loyalty cards. 28
Second, the named plaintiff proposed collecting affidavits from WeightSmart customers,
screened by an outside firm.29 The court rejected both proposed mechanisms because the named
plaintiff had “merely propose[d] a method of ascertaining a class without any evidentiary support
that the method will be successful.” 30
First, the court rejected the mechanism involving records of online sales and loyalty card
purchases because it was not “a manageable process that does not require much, if any, factual
inquiry.” 31 Instead, the proposed method named only one WeightSmart retailer that had a loyalty
23

Id. (quoting Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
Id. (quoting M ANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004)).
25
Id. (citing Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
26
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013).
27
Id. at 304.
28
Id. at 308.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 306.
31
Id. at 307–308 (quoting 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)).
24
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card program, and the named plaintiff had provided “no evidence that a single purchaser of
WeightSmart could be identified using records of customer membership cards or records of
online sales,” as well as “no evidence that retailers even have records for the relevant period.” 32
Second, in rejecting the named plaintiff’s mechanism involving self-identifying
affidavits, the court expanded upon two of the policy objectives it had highlighted in Marcus:
specifically, defendants’ due process rights and the protection of unnamed class members. First,
the court stated that, in order to ensure due process, “a defendant must be able to challenge class
membership,” which a defendant would not be able to do based solely on self-identifying
affidavits.33 Next, the court emphasized the need to protect unnamed class members not only to
ensure adequate notice under Rule 23(c), as it noted in Marcus, but also because it was “unfair to
absent class members if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by
fraudulent or inaccurate claims.” 34 The court reasoned that class members who joined the class
through fraudulent self-identifying affidavits would unfairly dilute the recovery paid out to
legitimate class members.35 The court also determined that the named plaintiff’s proposal that an
outside firm screen class members’ claims neither “show[ed] the affidavits would be reliable”
nor “propose[ed] a model for screening claims that is specific to this case.”36
Two years later, in Byrd, the Third Circuit backtracked somewhat from Carrera and
certified a proposed class despite the named plaintiff’s reliance on affidavits to identify class
members. In Byrd, the named plaintiff leased a computer from the defendant and later discovered
32

Id. at 309.
Id. It did not help that the named plaintiff in Carrera had difficulty remembering that he purchased WeightSmart
as opposed to another one of the defendant’s products. This called into doubt the reliability of self-identifying
affidavits for all class members.
34
Id. at 309–310.
35
Id. The Carrera court held this to be the case despite plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s due process rights
were protected by a maximum possible payout of $14 million, since the defendant’s records showed that it sold $14
million worth of WeightSmart in Florida.
36
Id. at 311.
33
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pre-installed spyware that had been videotaping her and members of her household.37 To identify
class members, who included both computer lessees and the members of their households who
had been videotaped, the named plaintiff proposed cross-checking addresses of lessees in the
defendant’s sales records with addresses provided by household members in affidavits.38 The
court held that the class was ascertainable, distinguishing Byrd’s identification mechanism,
which was administratively feasible, from Carrera’s, which was not. Although Carrera’s
proposed class relied solely on affidavits without any “objective records to identify class
members,” the Byrd court made clear that “Carrera does not suggest that no level of inquiry as
to the identity of class members can ever be undertaken” because “[i]f that were the case, no
Rule 23(b)(3) class could ever be certified.”39

b. Contrasting heightened and weak ascertainability standards
Ascertainability is currently subject to a circuit split. In addition to the Third Circuit,
three other circuits have adopted heightened ascertainability standards: the First Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit.40 Five circuits have adopted weak ascertainability
standards: the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the
Ninth Circuit.41 Under a weak ascertainability standard, the named plaintiff does not need to
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 170.
39
Id. at 170–171 (emphasis in original).
40
See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A class is not ascertainable unless the
class definition contains objective criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an administratively
feasible way.”); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306) (“The
definition of the class must be ‘definite,’ that is, the standards must allow the class members to be ascertainable.”);
EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
593 (3d Cir. 2012)) (“A class cannot be certified unless a court can readily identify the class members.”).
41
See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250, 264 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The ascertainability doctrine that governs
in this Circuit requires only that a class be defined using objective criteria.”); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844
F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We . . . declin[e] to adopt an administrative feasibility requirement.”); Sandusky
Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has not addressed
ascertainability as a separate preliminary requirement.”); Rikos v. P&G, 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We see
37
38
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demonstrate a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for identifying potential class
members. Instead, the named plaintiff must only define class membership with reference to
objective criteria.42 Thus, in circuits with weak ascertainability standards, the court’s certification
inquiry focuses only on the class definition provided by the named plaintiff, and not on how the
named plaintiff intends to identify potential class members.
The difference between heightened and weak ascertainability is best illustrated by
comparing the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard with the Seventh Circuit’s
weak ascertainability standard. The most recent case discussing ascertainability in the Third
Circuit is City Select.43 In City Select, the Third Circuit applied heightened ascertainability to a
proposed class of recipients of unsolicited fax advertisements from the defendant loan
company.44 The named plaintiff’s proposed mechanism for identifying class members involved
cross-checking self-identifying affidavits with the defendant’s customer database even though, as
the defendant argued, the database was over-inclusive, containing thousands more customers
than the fax recipients.45 The Third Circuit held that the named plaintiff’s identification
mechanism nonetheless fulfilled heightened ascertainability. First, the plaintiff defined the class
with reference to objective criteria—inclusion in the customer database—and not merely based
on a proposed class member’s state of mind.46 Second, the named plaintiff’s mechanism for
identifying class members was administratively feasible because “affidavits, in combination with
no reason to follow Carrera.”); Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Nothing in Rule
23 mentions or implies this heightened requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).”).
42
Compare Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (“The ascertainability inquiry is two-fold.”) with Mullins, 796 F.3d at 662 (“The
Third Circuit’s approach . . . goes much further than the established meaning of ascertainability and in our view
misreads Rule 23.”).
43
City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America, Inc., 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2017).
44
Id. at 436.
45
Id. at 441.
46
Id. at 439 n.3 (citing 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011)) (“Under the objective criteria
requirement, ‘[a] class definition that depends on subjective criteria, such as class members’ state of mind, will fail
for lack of definiteness.’”).
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records or other reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the ascertainability
standard.”47
On the other hand, in Mullins, the Seventh Circuit’s seminal case imposing weak
ascertainability, the named plaintiff had to jump through considerably fewer hoops to certify the
proposed class. In Mullins, the court held that the proposed class—purchasers of a falselyadvertised joint pain relief supplement—was defined with reference to objective criteria because
the named plaintiff “defin[ed] the class in terms of conduct (an objective fact) rather than a state
of mind.”48 The court then declined to adopt an administrative feasibility requirement because, in
other circuits, administrative feasibility had “erect[ed] a nearly insurmountable hurdle at the
class certification stage in situations where a class action is the only viable way to pursue valid
but small individual claims.”49 Moreover, in establishing weak ascertainability, the Mullins court
refuted the three policy objectives stressed by the Third Circuit in Marcus, Carrera, and Byrd:
that heightened ascertainability encourages efficiency by reducing administrative burdens,
prevents the dilution of payouts to unnamed class members, and protects the due process rights
of defendants.
First, the Mullins court determined that any concerns over excessive administrative
burdens were sufficiently addressed by Rule 23(b)(3)(D)’s manageability requirement.50 Rule
23(b)(3) requires the district court to “find[] that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”51 In conducting
that inquiry, the district court must consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class action”
47

Id. at 441 (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170–71).
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015).
49
Id. at 662.
50
Id. at 663 (“This concern about administrative inconvenience is better addressed by the explicit requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3).”).
51
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
48
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under Rule 23(b)(3)(D).52 According to the Mullins court, identifying class members was part
and parcel of any Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiry; thus, “imposing a stringent version of
ascertainability because of concerns about administrative inconvenience renders the
manageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous.”53
Second, the Mullins court found the risk of payout dilution due to fraudulent claims to be
negligible: it could point to “no empirical evidence that the risk of dilution caused by inaccurate
or fraudulent claims in the typical low-value consumer class action is significant.”54 Moreover,
the court found unrealistic that a claimant would sign an affidavit under the penalty of perjury to
recover, as was the case in Mullins, the $70 retail price of the supplement in question. 55
Third, the Mullins court pushed back at the Third Circuit’s characterization of
defendants’ due process rights, emphasizing that defendants do not possess the right “to a costeffective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership,” as the Carrera
court reasoned.56 Instead, defendants possess the narrower due process right to not “pay in excess
of [their] liability and to present individualized defenses if those defenses affect [their]
liability.”57 The Mullins court refused to ignore the “equally-important” policy objective of
“deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing,” and thus adopted weak ascertainability.58

c. A push for weak ascertainability in the Third Circuit
Recently, three opinions—one dissenting and two concurring—by Third Circuit judges
have encouraged walking back the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard. This
52

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663.
54
Id. at 667.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 669 (emphasis in original).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 668.
53
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push against heightened ascertainability evolved gradually, beginning with an opinion written by
Judge Ambro—notably, the author of the Marcus opinion that established the Third Circuit’s
heightened ascertainability standard—dissenting to the Third Circuit’s denial of an en banc
rehearing of Carrera.59 Judge Ambro stated that he “believe[s] . . . that Carrera goes too far”
because proposed class members “should not be made to suffer” due to deficiencies in the
defendant’s records.60 Judge Ambro further recognized that ascertainability, as a “creature of
common law,” demands flexibility in its application, “especially in instances where the
defendant’s actions cause the difficulty.” 61 Although Judge Ambro, as Marcus’s author, believed
that “the ability to identify class members is a set piece for Rule 23 to work,” he warned against
as “rigid” an application of ascertainability as occurred in Carrera.62
Two years later, Judge Rendell, who joined Judge Ambro’s Carrera dissent, wrote a
concurrence to Byrd that explicitly called for the Third Circuit “to do away with this newly
created aspect of Rule 23.”63 Judge Rendell believed that by prioritizing the prevention of
fraudulent claims, heightened ascertainability “has ignored an equally important policy objective
of class actions: deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing.” 64 If Judge Rendell’s language
sounds familiar, that is because it is: the Seventh Circuit used Judge Rendell’s concurrence as
one of the guideposts of its Mullins opinion, stating that the court “agree[s] in essence with Judge
Rendell’s concurring opinion in Byrd,” and citing to it five different times.65
59

Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at *3 (“When, as here, a defendant’s lack of records and business practices make it more difficult to ascertain
the members of an otherwise objectively verifiable low-value class, the consumers who make up that class should
not be made to suffer.”).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 175.
65
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015). Mullins also cited Judge Ambro’s Carrera dissent
three times.
60
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Most recently, in his City Select concurrence, Judge Fuentes also called for “rejecting our
added ascertainability requirement” and “requir[ing] only that a class be defined in reference to
objective criteria.”66 Pushing back against Marcus’s policy concerns about fraudulent class
members and defendants’ due process rights, Judge Fuentes argued that “they are already
sufficiently protected by the existing requirements of Rule 23.”67 Judge Fuentes also borrowed
verbatim language from Mullins to support the proposition that defendants do not have a due
process right to the most “cost-effective” method for challenging individual claims to class
membership.68 Throughout his concurrence, Judge Fuentes cited to Mullins eight times, and
Judge Rendell’s concurrence six times, indicating his desire to point the Third Circuit in the
direction of a weak ascertainability standard.

II.

Settlement-only classes in the Third Circuit
a. From Amchem to Prudential and Sullivan
Class actions can be certified for settlement purposes only when parties successfully

negotiate a settlement agreement, negating the need to go to trial. Although Rule 23(e)(2)
requires that a district court finds a proposed settlement agreement to be “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” before approving it, settlement-only classes nonetheless often face an easier path
toward certification.69 According to Professor Frankel, “from class counsel’s perspective, a big
advantage of the settlement-only action is that class certification is easier and settlement
approval is more likely because the class is being certified purely for settlement.”70
66

City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 448 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.,
concurring).
67
Id. at 444.
68
Id. at 447 (citing Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669) (emphasis in original).
69
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
70
Richard Frankel, The Disappearing Opt-Out Right in Putative-Damages Class Actions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 563,
572 (2011). See also Howard M. Erichson, Class Actions and Access to Justice: The Problem of Settlement Class
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This has rung true in the Third Circuit in particular, especially in Prudential and Sullivan,
two decisions issued in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Amchem decision. Amchem held that
settlement-only classes may not be certified unless they satisfy all of Rule 23’s certification
requirements, just like litigation classes. But the Court also stated in dicta that settlement was
“relevant to a class certification” when it came to manageability inquiries, and that when
“confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire
whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is
that there be no trial.”71
Embracing Amchem’s dicta, both Prudential and Sullivan worked around Amchem’s
holding, determining that, in certain circumstances, settlement-only classes may be certified even
if they would not be certified for trial. Prudential and Sullivan emphasized the policy objective
of global peace, which, they note, is especially difficult to come by in “any large, multi-district
class action.”72 Settlement-only classes, therefore, serve “the important policy interest of judicial
economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that prevent relitigation
of settled questions at the core of a class action.” 73 To safeguard these policy objectives, the
Sullivan and Prudential courts allowed settlement-only classes greater flexibility, even if there
would be manageability issues if the matter were to go to trial.
In Prudential, decided one year after Amchem, the Third Circuit affirmed the certification
of a settlement-only class despite differences in the state laws that governed the class members’
claims. The court ultimately found that the Prudential class was manageable because the
Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 976 (2014) (“Recent cases have departed from Amchem, but unfortunately
they have done so by adopting a more permissive stance toward settlement class actions.”).
71
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D)).
72
Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 311 (3d Cir. 2011).
73
In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 308 (3d Cir. 1998).
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“relatively minor differences in state law” among the class members’ claims could be overcome
by trying claims governed by similar state laws together. 74 The court drew from Amchem’s dicta,
determining that “after Amchem, the manageability inquiry in settlement-only classes may not be
significant.”75
The Sullivan court also declined to determine whether a settlement-only class was
manageable.76 In Sullivan, only some members of a proposed class of diamond purchasers had
standing to bring their claims due to variations in state antitrust laws.77 Drawing upon both
Amchem and Prudential, the court determined that “the concern for manageability that is a
central tenet in the certification of a litigation class is removed from the equation.”78 Thus,
variations in state law, even where standing was concerned, were matters of manageability, and
because “a settlement would eliminate the principal burden of establishing the elements of
liability under disparate laws,” there was no need for a manageability inquiry in the settlementonly context.79 In other words, at the certification stage for settlement-only classes, the district
court need not conduct thorough inquiries into “the legal viability of asserted claims.”80

b. Ascertainability inquiries and settlement-only classes
Because Amchem requires that settlement-only classes undergo the same certification
analyses as litigation classes, district courts across the country now conduct ascertainability
inquiries when considering the certification of proposed settlement-only classes. In circuits with
74

Id. at 316.
Id. at 321. See also id. at 316 n.57 (“This [manageability] analysis, depending on the facts in each case, may no
longer be necessary in the context of settlement-only class certification.”).
76
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
77
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 273.
78
Id. at 302–303.
79
Id. at 303.
80
Id. at 305. The court stated that this should instead be handled during the Motion to Dismiss stage.
75
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heightened ascertainability standards, courts have held that settlement-only classes satisfy the
administrative feasibility requirement when defendants produce records through which plaintiffs
can identify prospective class members.81 For example, in Silvis, a case concerning artificiallyinflated utility prices, a court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the
defendant’s billing records “provide a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for
identifying” individuals who subscribed to the defendant’s “specific energy program during
specific periods of time.”82 In contrast, in circuits with weak ascertainability standards, courts
have focused their inquiries on the objectivity of the class’s definition. 83 For example, in Wright,
a court in the Northern District of Illinois held that a proposed class of recipients of phone calls
that violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act was ascertainable “because members
belong to the class if they are on a list in [the defendant’s] records,” which meant that it was
“possible to identify class members without any subjective criteria.” 84
In the only case in which the Third Circuit has considered the application of heightened
ascertainability to a settlement-only class, Comcast reversed a district court’s determination that
a settlement-only class was not ascertainable. In reconciling the Third Circuit’s heightened
81
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Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, 316 F.R.D. 215, 226–27 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding that a class defined as the recipients
of calls or texts from the defendant was ascertainable).
84
Wright v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 WL 4505169, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016).
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ascertainability standard with Sullivan’s holding that manageability need not be analyzed in
settlement-only classes, a panel of Judge Krause, Judge Scirica—who authored both Prudential
and Carrera, as well as a concurrence to Sullivan—and Judge Fuentes—whose City Select
concurrence pushed for the Third Circuit to adopt weak ascertainability—held in Comcast that
the proposed settlement-only class was ascertainable “because the settlement agreement removes
the need for a trial.”85
In Comcast, the named plaintiff and Comcast established in their settlement agreement a
mechanism for identifying members of a class of both former and current Comcast subscribers
who rented set-top boxes.86 Although Comcast possessed records of current subscribers, its
records of former subscribers were incomplete.87 Thus, to identify former subscribers, the
settlement agreement called for combining self-identifying affidavits with “additional
documentation” ranging from credit card statements to police reports. 88 The district court held
that it was “implausible” that the proposed documentation “would ever demonstrate that an
individual subscribed to Premium Cable from Comcast and rented a Set-Top Box.” 89 Further,
the court reasoned that relying on inconclusive evidence to prove class membership would
violate Comcast’s due process right to challenge the evidence before the court that purports to
identify class members.90 Thus, without reliable documentation, the class was not ascertainable
because former Comcast subscribers would need to rely on “affidavits alone, without any
objective records” to prove class membership, which was not administratively feasible. 91
In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8, 9 (3d Cir. 2016).
In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 145, 152 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
87
Id. at 147. Comcast only possessed records since 2011 for former subscribers, but the class period ran from 2005
until the court’s preliminary approval of the settlement agreement.
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The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. In a three-sentence order, the court first
determined that Comcast’s inability to “test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove
class membership” was not at issue because, in the settlement agreement, “the defendant has
agreed that the evidence regarding class membership is sufficiently reliable.”92 Thus, policy
concerns about defendants’ due process rights were not at stake because the mechanism put forth
to identify class members was approved, in a settlement agreement, by the defendant.
Second, the court found that “the concern that ‘[t]he method of determining whether
someone is in the class . . . be administratively feasible’ . . . is not implicated by this case,
because the settlement agreement removes the need for a trial.”93 To support this proposition, the
court cited to Judge Scirica’s Sullivan concurrence, which stated that “the settlement class
presents no management problems because the case will not be tried.” 94 Thus, the Comcast court
determined that there was no administrative feasibility requirement for the proposed class
because it was a settlement-only class, and settlement-only classes do not need to be tried. Just
like in Sullivan, which concluded that “variations [in state laws] are irrelevant to certification of
a settlement class,”95 the variations between current and former subscribers were irrelevant to the
certification of Comcast’s settlement-only class. Therefore, there was no need, from both a
manageability and ascertainability perspective, to identify all class members at the certification
stage.96
In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 656 F. App’x 8, 8 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 9 (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013)).
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determining whether a proposed class has satisfied Rule 23(a) commonality. This is not wholly relevant to
identifying members of the Comcast settlement-only class. Thus, I have concluded that the court is citing to Judge
Scricia’s second point, about manageability, as discussed above.
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III.

Drawing from Comcast, Mullins, and Sullivan to circumvent the heightened
ascertainability standard in the settlement-only context
As demonstrated by Comcast’s district court decision, the certification of settlement-only

classes is jeopardized by heightened ascertainability. Although Comcast is the only Third Circuit
case to have reversed a district court’s ascertainability determination in the settlement-only
context, and the Comcast order is not precedential, Comcast nonetheless offers a blueprint for
counsel attempting to avoid applying heightened ascertainability to settlement-only classes. I
propose two pathways for doing so. First, I use Sullivan and Mullins to demonstrate how the
Third Circuit could apply a weak ascertainability standard to settlement-only classes. Second, I
propose that settlement agreements between the parties, in and of themselves, can serve as
substitutes for ascertainability inquiries by mitigating key policy concerns.

a. Using case law to read ascertainability into manageability
Comcast stands for the proposition that administrative feasibility inquiries are
unnecessary in the settlement-only context: because settlement-only classes will not go to trial,
the court need not estimate “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” by “determining
whether someone is in the class [through an] administratively feasible . . . method.” 97 The
Comcast decision therefore reads administrative feasibility into Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability
inquiries. In Comcast, the Third Circuit suggests that, because Rule 23(b)(3)(D) applies only to
litigation classes, as established in Sullivan, and because both Rule 23(b)(3)(D) and
ascertainability seek to achieve the same core goal of identifying potential class members, the

Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., No. CV 09-MD-2034, 2018 WL 4252463, at *7n.11
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D); Comcast, 656 F. App’x at 8.
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Third Circuit should do away with the administrative feasibility requirement when certifying
proposed settlement-only classes. Put another way, because Sullivan dictates that courts need not
conduct a manageability inquiry when certifying settlement-only classes, reading administrative
feasibility into manageability means that courts will not need to apply heightened ascertainability
to settlement-only classes.
Comcast’s citation to Judge Scirica’s Sullivan concurrence is interesting for two reasons.
First, the concept of ascertainability did not exist when the court decided Sullivan: Marcus, the
first case to apply ascertainability to a proposed class in the Third Circuit, was decided one year
after Sullivan. Second, in Comcast, whether the class was ascertainable or not did not turn on
differences in state law among class members’ claims, but instead on differences between current
subscribers, about whom Comcast possessed records, and former subscribers, for whom there
were incomplete records. Thus, it is not immediately obvious why the Comcast court cited to
Sullivan. But despite the differences between Sullivan’s variations in state law and Comcast’s
variations in subscribers, Sullivan’s language about “litigating colorable claims” parallels
language about “mini-trials” used by the Third Circuit in refining its ascertainability standard.
The Third Circuit wrote in Sullivan that “litigating whether a claim is ‘colorable’ and defending
who is in and who is not in the class would be an endless process, preventing the parties from
seriously getting to, and engaging in, settlement negotiations. . . . [T]he ‘individualized’ nature of
the task would doom the class certification process from the outset.” 98 Under Sullivan, then, and
in the interest of judicial economy, there is no need for proof on the merits of whether every
individual class member belongs in a settlement-only class. This mirrors the Third Circuit’s
language about ascertainability throughout the Marcus line of cases—that, at the certification
98
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phase, “a trial court should ensure that class members can be identified without extensive and
individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials.’”99 This parallel language reflects the near-identical
nature of the ascertainability and manageability inquiries, and the identical goals each inquiry
seeks to achieve.
Additionally, Mullins explicitly read administrative feasibility into manageability, by
determining that ascertainability “is better addressed by the explicit requirements of Rule
23(b)(3),” as well as the district courts’ “discretion to press the plaintiff for details about the
plaintiff’s plan to identify class members . . . if the proposed class presents unusually difficult
management problems.””100 According to Mullins, Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiries are
sufficient to “eliminate[] serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the
efficiencies expected in a class action” without a separate ascertainability inquiry. 101 Thus, the
Mullins court believed that Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability encompasses administrative
feasibility because, at their core, both inquiries seek to solve the same problem: identifying class
members. In other words, because the Seventh Circuit already viewed identifying class members
as part of its manageability inquiry, by the time Mullins appeared on its docket, there was no
need for heightened ascertainability.
The biggest hurdle to reading administrative feasibility into manageability in the Third
Circuit is Byrd, which stressed that ascertainability inquiries are conducted independently from
and prior to Rule 23 analyses.102 However, notably, some Third Circuit opinions have suggested
99
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reading administrative feasibility into manageability despite Byrd. Before Byrd was decided, for
example, Marcus stated that “ascertainability problems spill over into the [Rule 23(b)(3)]
predominance inquiry,”103 and Carrera stated that “administrative feasibility means that
identifying class members is a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual
factual inquiry.”104
Further, Judge Rendell’s Byrd concurrence acknowledged the similarities between
ascertainability and manageability, stating that administrative feasibility “does nothing to ensure
the manageability of a class or the ‘efficiencies’ of the class action mechanism.”105 Judge
Fuentes’ City Select concurrence is even more direct. Citing to Mullins, Judge Fuentes argued
that “imposing a separate manageability requirement within ascertainability ‘renders
the manageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous,’”106 and that the
ascertainability requirement “understates the ability of district courts to manage their cases.”107
In addition, other district-level Third Circuit cases since Byrd have read ascertainability
into manageability, though not in the settlement-only context.108 For example, in Vista
Healthplan, a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the named plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration after the plaintiff “argu[ed] that [Judge Goldberg] made clear errors
of fact and law by conflating ascertainability with predominance.”109 In particular, the plaintiff
103
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took issue with Judge Goldberg’s statement that “many individualized questions must be
answered in order to determine whether an individual falls within the class definition.”110
However, Judge Goldberg maintained that “it is clear from [Byrd and Carrera] that in assessing
whether a proposed ascertainability methodology is administratively feasible, the court may also
consider the extent of individualized inquiry.” 111 Thus, Judge Goldberg read ascertainability into
manageability, and held that the proposed class was not ascertainable because “the problems
identified with respect to ascertainability . . . would clearly cause problems with case
management.”112
Similarly, in Mladenov, a district court in the District of New Jersey determined that a
proposed litigation class—comprised of grocery shoppers who purchased bakery products
labeled as “fresh” when they were in fact frozen—was not ascertainable.113 Identifying the
customers, the court found, “would require the exact type of ascertainability complication
that Carrera warns against, namely requiring mini-trials to determine who belongs in the class,”
which would result in “enormous difficulties in managing these class actions.”114 The Mladenov
court thus deemed the class not ascertainable because of the manageability issues it would
present.
Therefore, the Third Circuit has the tools at its disposal to read administrative feasibility
into manageability in the settlement-only context. Counsel could cite to Comcast, Sullivan,
Mullins, and the Byrd and City Select concurrences—as well as language from Marcus and
Carrera—to arrive at a weak ascertainability standard for settlement-only classes. By reading
110

Id. at *12.
Id. at *2.
112
Id. at *5.
113
Mladenov v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 127, 132 (D.N.J. 2015).
114
Id.
111

23

administrative feasibility into manageability, and because Sullivan removes the need for
manageability inquiries for settlement-only classes, the Third Circuit ascertainability inquiry for
settlement-only classes should not require an analysis into the proposed class’s administrative
feasibility.

b. Using settlement agreements to overcome heightened ascertainability’s policy concerns
In Comcast, the “evidence [the parties] submitted to prove class membership” in their
settlement agreement was “sufficiently reliable” because the defendant agreed to the terms of the
settlement agreement. 115 This suggests that settlement agreements mitigate concerns over
defendants’ due process rights, as well as concerns over excessive administrative burdens.
Perhaps, then, settlement agreements could act as substitutes for administrative feasibility
inquiries, as long as parties define the proposed class with reference to objective criteria and
agree on a mechanism for identifying class members in the settlement agreement. In other words,
through settlement agreements, parties can eliminate two of the policy concerns associated with
heightened ascertainability and administrative feasibility. First, because the parties will have
agreed on how to carry out and pay for a mechanism for identifying class members, the parties
will have mitigated concerns over imposing excessive administrative burdens on both the parties
and the court to identify class members. Second, the parties will have eliminated concerns over
the defendants’ due process right to challenge the evidence before the court because the
defendant will have agreed to the adequacy of the evidence used to identify class members in the
settlement agreement.
115
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In circuits with heightened ascertainability standards, district courts have held proposed
classes to be ascertainable because of the existence of a settlement agreement. 116 For example, in
Gregory, a court in the District of New Jersey determined that the proposed class was
ascertainable because the settlement agreement defined the class using “objective, narrow
criteria.”117 The court also noted that, in developing the settlement agreement, the parties worked
together to find helpful identifying records, estimate the number of class members, and revise the
initial proposed class definition.118 Additionally, the court pointed to the fact that the
“[d]efendant neither disputes the class definition nor the scope of proposed class claims.”119 The
proposed class was thus ascertainable due to the settlement agreement between the parties.
Although reading ascertainability into settlement agreements would protect the due
process rights of defendants and alleviate worries over administrative burdens, it would not take
care of the third policy concern discussed in the Marcus line of cases: protecting unnamed class
members, whose recovery could be diluted by fraudulent class members. But language from
Carrera suggests otherwise, and indicates that Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation
requirement could assuage concerns over fraudulent class members. Carrera states that “if
fraudulent or inaccurate claims materially reduce true class members’ relief, these class members
could argue the named plaintiff did not adequately represent them because he proceeded with the
understanding that absent members may get less than full relief.”120 Thus, a collateral Rule
116
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23(a)(4) review could protect unnamed class members from being inadequately represented
during settlement negotiations and in the ultimate settlement agreement.
The Mullins court also determined that diluted recovery rarely, if ever, occurs, finding
“no empirical evidence that the risk of dilution caused by inaccurate or fraudulent claims in the
typical low-value consumer class action is significant.”121 Even if there were a risk, the Mullins
court noted the infrequency with which eligible claimants actually submit claims for
compensation in consumer class actions, making the danger of dilution “not so great that it
justifies denying class certification altogether.” 122 Further, courts have historically had many
tools at their disposal to combat fraudulent claims, including claims administrators, auditors, and
random sampling.123 The Mullins court therefore viewed the protection of unnamed class
members as an issue outside the purview of a district judge’s administrative feasibility inquiry.
Instead, dilution was merely a “claim administration issue[].”124
Thus, a thorough claims administration process, coupled with the minimal administrative
burdens and the due process protections offered by settlement agreements, could eliminate the
need for an administrative feasibility requirement for settlement-only classes.

IV.

Conclusion
In this paper, I proposed two ways for the Third Circuit to justify applying weak

ascertainability to settlement-only classes. The two proposals would be most effective if
presented together: the first proposal would draw from the precedent case law to read
ascertainability into manageability, and the second proposal would draw upon settlement
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agreements between parties to assure courts that key ascertainability policy concerns are being
considered.
The time is ripe for the Third Circuit to apply weak ascertainability to settlement-only
classes. The Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard is only seven years old and, in
its youth, faces both inconsistency in its application and instability in its future direction.
Because the Third Circuit has historically certified settlement-only classes with more leniency,
incentivizing parties to create settlement agreements for purposes of judicial efficiency and
global peace, the Third Circuit should adopt a weak ascertainability standard for settlement-only
classes. And the stage is set: with at least three judges pushing for a weak ascertainability
standard, and with an established overlap between ascertainability and manageability, settlementonly classes represent fertile ground for the Third Circuit to take the first steps in removing its
administrative feasibility requirement.
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